Some New Observations on ‘because (of) ’ ⋆ by Torgrim Solstad
Some New Observations on ‘because (of)’⋆
Torgrim Solstad
Institute for Natural Language Processing (IMS), University of Stuttgart
torgrim@ims.uni-stuttgart.de
Abstract. Because (of) is ambiguous between a ‘reason’ and a ‘plain
cause’ interpretation. Presenting a semantic analysis within the frame-
work of Discourse Representation Theory, I argue that because (of) al-
ways denotes a causal relation between causing facts and caused entites
of various sorts and that its interpretational variance is dependent on the
ontological nature of the caused entity. Finally, I point to a diﬀerence be-
tween sentential-complement because and nominal-complement because
of with regard to their interaction with modals. Whereas both because
and because of may outscope e.g. deontic necessity modals, only because
may outscope epistemic modal operators.
1 Introduction: plain causes and reasons
Causal because (of) adjuncts are ambiguous between a reason and a plain cause
interpretation as exempliﬁed by the sentences in (1)-(2):1
(1) Reason:
a. The dog was put down because of its aggressiveness.
b. I picked out the painting because it matches my wall.
(2) Plain cause:
a. Last winter, a homeless person died because of low temperatures.
b. The stunt plane crashed because it ran out of petrol.
In (1a), the complement of because of, its aggressiveness, is interpreted as a
prominent part of the reason or motive of some agent for putting down the
dog. Similarly in (1b), the picking out of the painting is motivated by the fact
that it matches the wall of the speaker. Assuming that because (of) introduces
a causal relation, I will assume that what is caused in the case of the reason
interpretation, is an attitudinal state.
With regard to the plain cause interpretation in (2a), on the other hand,
the complement of because of, low temperatures, is interpreted as the direct or
⋆ I would like to thank Nicholas Asher, Rainer B¨ auerle, Fritz Hamm, Hans Kamp,
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1 In the below discussion of the general semantic properties of because (of), I will
mostly use examples involving nominal-complement because of. The overall analysis
carries over to sentential-complement because, though. See Section 3 for a diﬀerence
in interpretation between the two variants.indirect cause of the death of the homeless person. Similar remarks apply to
(2b). The plain cause interpretation emerges when the caused event is not under
the control of an agent. It should be noted that ‘plain’ does not refer to a certain
complexity of the causal chain involved. It is intended to highlight the diﬀerence
between this interpretation of because (of) and the reason interpretation, which,
as will become clearer below, is also a cause of sorts.
Despite its frequent occurence in the literature on causation in general, there
exist surprisingly few formal analyses of sentential-complement because (cf. e.g.
Hara 2008, Johnston 1994, Kratzer 1998), and – to my knowledge – no such
analyses of nominal-complement because of. Thus, one of the primary goals of
this paper is to contribute towards a better understanding of the semantics of
because (of) and a precisiﬁcation of some of the factors which determine its
interpretation. Accordingly, the paper consists of two main parts: I ﬁrst pro-
vide a discourse representation theoretic analysis of because (of) which is more
eleborate than previous ones, showing what an account of the interpretational
variation of because (of) must encompass. I then discuss some subtle diﬀerences
between because and because of having to do with their interaction with deontic
and epistemic modal operators.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, I present
the semantics for because (of) including a discussion of the lexical organization of
the interpretational variants. In Section 3, I discuss the diﬀerences between the
sentential and nominal complement variants with regard to scopal interaction
with modals. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 A DRT Semantics for ‘because of’
The semantic analysis of because (of) is framed within the framework of Dis-
course Representation Theory (DRT; for an overview, see Kamp & Reyle 1993,
van Genabith et al. to appear; for a treatment of some aspects of event-based
causality within DRT, see Kamp & Roßdeutscher 1994, Solstad 2007). Before
presenting the semantic analysis, I would like to make some brief remarks on
the relation between because and because of. Basically, I regard the two to make
a very similar semantic contribution, representing them both by means of the
same, underspeciﬁed semantics. The variation which may be observed (cf. Sec-
tion 3), I contend, is due to the fact that because takes sentential, whereas because
of takes nominal complements. I will however remain neutral with regard to the
issue whether the preposition because of and the conjunction because may also
be regarded to be one lexeme, only subject to morphosyntactic variation with
respect to the realisation of their complement. When discussing the distribu-
tional diﬀerences with regard to modal operators mentioned above (cf. Section
3), this issue will be of some importance.2
2 More than once, it has been suggested to me that because and because of diﬀer with
regard to the availability of phonological reduction, which could be taken to provide
an argument in favour of treating the two variants diﬀerently both morphosyntacti-e y f
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f:
d s
s:low(d)
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Fig.1. DRS showing plain cause interpretation of because (of)
On my analysis, because (of) introduces a causal relation. I further claim
that the interpretational variance which can be observed with regard to plain
cause or reason interpretations is determined by the ontological nature of the
arguments which enter into this causal relation. As we will see below, a reason
interpretation can – not very surprisingly – only occur if intentionality is present.
However, we will also see that this feature alone is not suﬃcient to predict the
interpretation of because (of).
Although approaching the semantics of because (of) from a diﬀerent per-
spective than Kratzer (1998), who focuses on the interaction of (sentential-
complement) because with indeﬁnites, I share with Kratzer the idea that the
ambiguity of because (of) can be dealt with by means of a common underspeci-
ﬁed semantic representation. However, it is an important objective of this paper
to enrich the insights oﬀered by Kratzer (1998) and e.g. Johnston (1994), showing
more explicitly how the diﬀerent interpretations of because (of) emerge.
I assume that because (of) always involves a causal relation between a causing
fact (as introduced by its syntactic complement) and some caused entity, which
may be a state, an event, an attitudinal or a modal state (corresponding to the
syntactic phrase to which the PP is adjoined).
I ﬁrst turn to the plain cause reading in (2a), repeated below for convenience:
(2a) Last winter, a homeless person died because of low temperatures.
As modiﬁers of predicates which designate states or unintentionally per-
formed events, such as die, because (of) phrases can trivially only be interpreted
as plain causes. The semantics of (2a) is provided in the Discourse Representa-
tion Structure (DRS) in Figure 1 (ignoring tense and other aspects not relevant
to my present purpose). The causal relation introduced by because is printed in
boldface as the topmost condition of the DRS. The causing fact of this relation
occurs below this condition. In the case of (2a), the fact f of the temperatures
being low causes the event of dying, which is the only eventuality that can be
cally and semantically. However, data from conversations and informal writing show
that both variants are subject to such reduction. Thus, one may ﬁnd both cos as a
reduction of because on the one hand, and cos of as a reduction of because of on the
other.modiﬁed by the because of phrase. At the bottom of the DRS, the simple event
(not involving intentionality) which enters the causal relation as the caused en-
tity, is represented. Admittedly, there is a lot to be said about the nature of the
CAUSE predicate itself. For reasons of space, I cannot delve into that matter here
and will leave the discussion of the simple case of the plain cause interpretation
here.
Before discussing the reason interpretation, let me make some brief remarks
on the nature of the causing entity in the causal relation introduced by because
(of). As stated above, this causing entity always needs to be of fact type. In-
formally, facts are taken to be true propositional entities involving existential
quantiﬁcation. Although this is certainly not wholly uncontroversial (cf. e.g.
Fine 1982, Kratzer 2002), it is a useful approximation that helps explain a num-
ber of distributional facts with respect to the possible arguments of nominal-
complement because of. Since only very few nouns can be claimed to have ref-
erential arguments of fact type (possible exceptions include fact, circumstance
among others, cf. Asher 1993), we expect the occurence of most nouns as com-
plements of because of to be accompanied by a process of reinterpreting the
referential arguments as a fact, cf. (3):
(3) People are telling us they are using the bus because of the gas prices.
In (3), the because of phrase cannot be adequately intepreted as simply saying
that the fact that gas is priced causes people to take the bus. Rather, it is a
particular quality of that price, very likely that it is high (or far above its normal
level), which is the cause of people taking the bus. Notice, however, that this
interpretational speciﬁcation can only occur by way of reinterpretation or similar
mechanisms since it is not explicitly expressed. I take a sortal conﬂict, according
to which the DP the gas prices does not meet the selectional restrictions of
because of out of the lexicon, to be the trigger of reinterpretation (Egg 2005).
Turning now to the reason interpretation of because (of), consider again the
example in (1a), repeated below for convenience:
(1a) The dog was put down because of its aggressiveness.
In combination with predicates of intentional action such as put down, because
(of) phrases are interpreted as reasons or motives (subject to certain, well-
deﬁned restrictions which will be discussed below). In this case, as can be seen
from the DRS for (1a) in Figure 2, the discourse referent which enters the causal
relation as the caused entity, is an attitudinal state satt of some agent x (the
argument of do), which consists of an intention INT to put down the dog (van
Genabith et al. to appear).3 Importantly, this analysis amounts to viewing rea-
3 The repetition of conditions which can be observed in Figure 2 is indeed intended.
However, for reasons of space, it is a matter which I cannot discuss here. It may
be noted that the EXEC predicate provides information that the intention of the
attitude-holder is actually realized. See van Genabith et al. (to appear) for details.e e1 e2 f y satt x
f cause satt
f:
s z
s: aggressive(z)
satt:att(x,{l1, INT,
e1 e2 y
e=e1⊕ e2
e1: do(i)
e2: become(dead(y))
e1 cause e2
dog(y)
 })
exec(x,e,l1)
e = e1⊕ e2
e1: do(x)
e2: become(dead(y))
e1 cause e2
dog(y)
Fig.2. DRS for reason intepretation of because (of)
sons as caused attitudinal states.4 What is more, assuming the causative relation
to be transitive, the fact f may also indirectly be seen as a cause of death.
The ambiguity of because (of) between the plain cause and reason interpre-
tations is not directly derivable from the representations in Figures 1 and 2. In
both ﬁgures, the (underspeciﬁed) relation CAUSE occurs. Ultimately, the above
analysis needs to be complemented by an appropriate theory of causality which
makes clear how a causal relation may be subject to interpretational variation
depending on the ontological nature of its argument. Short of being able to
present such a theory, I will for the sake of simplicity assume that this theory
allows us to state meaning postulates such as (4) specifying how the occurence of
certain arguments in the causal relation leads to a diﬀerence in realisation of the
causal relation.5 Thus, (4) should be taken to state that whenever an attitudinal
state is caused by a fact – the latter ontological category not being subject to
any variation in the case of because (of) – the fact is a reason of the holder of
the attitudinal state for being in whatever state this is:
(4) f CAUSE satt =⇒ f REASON satt
4 This is certainly a view which will be too strong to cover the various uses of the notion
of reason in the philosophical literature. Still, I believe that it oﬀers a perspective
which could be of interest beyond the discussion of the semantics of because (of).
5 In particular, due to the singular character of attitudinal states, one needs a more
sophisticated theory of causation than the standard counterfactual approach of e.g.
Lewis (1973).Having presented the basic characteristics of the plain cause and reason in-
terpretations of because (of), I want to point at some data which show that the
interpretational variation is not only dependent on the presence or absence of
an agent capable of intentional action. Interestingly, the presence of intentional-
ity is not enough to predict a reason interpretation of the because (of) phrase.
Thus, in contexts involving modals expressing deontic necessity (5a), possibility
(5b) or ability (not exempliﬁed here), a reason interpretations is not available
for because (of): the because of phrases in (5) can only be interpreted as plain
causes:
(5) a. The dog had to be put down because of its aggressiveness.
b. Because of the high crystallisation energies it is possible to measure
the crystal growth in transdermal patches even at 25℃.
Sentence (5a) can only be interpreted as saying that the aggressiveness of the
dog caused the necessity to put it down. The because of phrase cannot target
the attitudinal state associated with put down. There is no reading available for
(5a) according to which it is necessary for the agent to put the dog down for
the reason of the dog being aggressive (as opposed to it being three-legged, for
instance). Since (5a) is identical to (1a) apart from the presence of the deontic
necessity modal had to, it seems reasonable to make the modal responsible for
the unavailability of the reason interpretation. As indicated by the DRS for
(5a) in Figure 3, this is accounted for by assuming that in this case, the causal
relation persists between the fact f and the modal state s[D] consisting of a
deontic modal operator [D]MB (MB is short for modal base) which takes scope
over the DRS for (1a) in Figure 2. The modal blocks access to the attitudinal
state in its scope. Consequently, the map in (4) is not applicable in the case of
Figure 3. The absence of a reason interpretation is seen to have its rationale in
the observation that if something is necessarily the case, reasoning or motives are
of no importance. Put diﬀerently, if an obligation pertains, it does so regardless
of someone’s attitudinal state.
So far, I have said very little about the syntax of because (of). Unfortunately,
I cannot go into details here, but it may be noted that the behaviour of because
(of) in combination with deontic modals, not allowing a reason interpretation,
seems to indicate that the assumptions in Johnston (1994) are not adequate
for my purposes. Johnston assumes that because adjuncts (he does not discuss
because of ) have two possible adjunction sites, one at IP level and one at VP
level. If this were the case, one should expect the excluded reason interpretation
to be available e.g. in the case of (5a) after all, assuming that the VP level
constitutes a position below any modal operators. Unless one wants to make
use of any semantic ﬁltering mechanism, I think it is fair to conclude that the
semantic observations above suggest that it is more plausible that because (of)
has a ﬁxed adjunct position which is above not only VP, but also above any
projections where (deontic) modals are introduced. The data which Johnston
seeks to explain (having to do with the interaction between negation and because
adjuncts) must thus be explained diﬀerently. In the next section, I will makes[D] f
f cause s[D]
f:
s z
s: aggressive(z)
s[D]: [D]MB:
e e1 e2 f y satt x
satt:att(x,{l1, INT,
e1 e2 y
e=e1⊕ e2
e1: do(i)
e2: become(dead(y))
e1 cause e2
dog(y)
 })
exec(x,e,l1)
e = e1⊕ e2
e1: do(x)
e2: become(dead(y))
e1 cause e2
dog(y)
Fig.3. DRS representation of ‘because of’ outscoping a deontic necessity modal
some remarks on possible syntactic adjunction sites for because and because of
adjuncts.
Summarizing the analysis so far, I claimed that because (of) denotes a causal
relation between a causing fact and a caused entity of various ontological cat-
egories. If what is caused is a (modal) state or a simple event not involving
intentionality, a ‘plain cause’ interpretation results, if what is caused is an in-
tentionally performed event or otherwise involves an attitudinal state, a ‘reason’
interpretation results.
3 ‘Because of’ vs. ‘because’ in Epistemic Modal Contexts
I claimed that the above observations are valid for both sentential-complement
because and nominal-complement because of. However, there is one interesting
aspect for which the two variants diﬀer with respect to their possible inter-
pretations. Consider the examples in (6), in which must should be interpreted
epistemically:
(6) a. Bill must have gone back home because the jacket is missing.
b. Bill must have gone back home because of the missing jacket.
Whereas (6a) is ambiguous, (6b) is not. In (6a), the because phrase speciﬁes either
(i) Bill’s reason or motive for going back home, parallel to (1a) as analysed inthe DRS in Figure 2, or (ii) the speaker’s reason (evidence) for inferring that
Bill must have gone back home, i.e. the speaker sees that the jacket is missing
and concludes from this that Bill must have gone back home. In (6b), however,
only the former interpretation (i) is available for the because of phrase. Thus,
although one might expect that the semantics of because of should principally
be identical to that of because if the complement of because of is reinterpreted as
a proposition-like fact, the examples in (6) show that this cannot be the whole
story.
Although the ambiguity of because in (6a) is well-known (cf. e.g. Sweetser
1990), the diﬀerence in interpretational possibilities displayed between (6a) and
(6b) is not very well understood. In fact, the only discussion of the contrast in
(6) that I am aware of, is found in Degand (2000), which I will return to below.
Admittedly, I do not have a ﬁnal answer to why this diﬀerence shows up, either,
but in what follows, I want to point out how my analysis could be extended
towards explaining the diﬀerence displayed in (6).
One possibility to deal with the data in (6) would be to assume that scopal
diﬀerences with regard to diﬀerent modal operators are involved in the varying
behaviour in (6). Thus, one could assume that because and because of do display
a diﬀerence in syntactic behaviour, despite their semantic parallels, where only
because adjuncts may outscope epistemic modals. Thus, Degand (2000: p. 692)
assumes that because of adjuncts appear at an “intra-clausal” level where no
epistemic modal operators are available. On the other hand, because clauses are
adjoined at an “inter-clausal” level, where epistemic operators may be embedded
under the causal relation introduced by because. In line with this, it is also
imaginable that what matters for the diﬀerence is the possibility of modifying
speech act operators, as discussed by Scheﬄer (2005), thus making a parallel to
Austin’s (1961) famous biscuit conditionals (cf. e.g. Siegel 2006 and Predelli 2009
for discussion). In this case, because would unite the split behaviour of German
denn and weil, the latter of which does not allow the evidential reading in (6a).
The matter is not quite clear to me though, since the evidential interpretation
in (6a) seems intuitively diﬀerent from the “movie causal” in (7):
(7) What are you doing tonight, because there’s a good movie on. (Sweetser
1990: p. 77)
Additionally, Scheﬄer’s ‘conventional implicature’ approach demands that Ger-
man denn does not denote a causal relation, which is hardly plausible for because
(of).
A last possibility to explain the diﬀerence in (6) that I would like to men-
tion is exploiting the categorical diﬀerence between the complements of because
and because of : On this view, only the (syntactically) clausal complements of
because and no DPs such as the complements of because of may be interpreted
evidentially as it would be needed for the reading which (6b) lacks. This could
be connected to the process of reinterpretation which is involved in the case
of nominal-complement because of. According to this view, the proposition-like
reinterpretation of the complement of because of would only seemingly lead toan interpretation parallel to the truly propositional sentential complements of
because. However, this solution cannot be any less murky than the assumptions
concerning the nature of facts.
As it stands now, the diﬀerence in adjunction sites seems to me to be the
most plausible and promising option for solving the problems posed by the data
in (6).
4 Conclusion and outlook
Summarizing, I argued that the factive causal relation introduced by because (of)
phrases, f cause e or f cause s in the DRSs in Figures 1, 2 and 3, is assumed
to be neutral with regard to its interpretation as a plain cause or reason. If what
is caused is a non-intentional state or event, a plain cause interpretation results,
whereas whenever an attitudinal state is caused, the because (of) complement
is interpreted as a reason. In case what is caused is a deontic modal state, only
plain cause interpretations are possible, regardless whether the modal embeds an
attitudinal state or not. I also discussed some data involving epistemic modals
for which because and because of diﬀered: only because adjuncts seem able to
outscope epistemic modal operators.
Future work needs to involve an attempt at clarifying the notion of facts and
an explication of the theory of causation, at least to the extent that it is needed
for the purpose of the present analysis. In addition, because should be compared
with other causal expressions in English such as since, which only seems to have
the reason interpretation. Finally, comparing because (of) to similar expressions
in other languages would be helpful. Whereas the German preposition wegen ‘be-
cause of’ seems to behave completely parallel to nominal-complement because of,
sentential-complement because unites the function of denn and weil in German.
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